

1 **TITLE**

2 A Systematic Review of Measles Virus Transmissibility in the Air to Guide Exposure Periods
3 for Contact Tracing in Public Spaces

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23

24 **ETHICAL STATEMENT**

25 Interviews cited within this systematic review informed its basis and were approved by the
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27 #00028357) and not considered human subjects research.

28

29 **WORD COUNT, TABLES, AND FIGURES**

30 2,996 words; 1 table; 1 figure

31

32

33 **ABSTRACT (250 words)**

34 **Objective:** Epidemiological evidence was systematically reviewed to determine how long
35 the measles virus remains transmissible after an infectious case leaves a public space to
36 address inconsistencies in measles contact tracing exposure window guidelines.

37 **Methods:** A systematic literature review following PRISMA guidelines was conducted using
38 PubMed, EMBASE, Web of Science, and SCOPUS databases for publications from January
39 1988 to July 2024. Additional sources were identified through reference list reviews and
40 Google Scholar searches. Studies examining how long the measles virus survives in the air
41 or remains transmissible after an infectious case leaves a public space were included,
42 while non-evidence-based recommendations and mathematical models were excluded.

43 **Results:** Initial database searches identified 1,054 studies, with none meeting initial
44 inclusion criteria after screening. Supplemental searches identified five relevant articles
45 (1964-1987). Two experimental studies demonstrated measles virus survival between 30
46 and 120 minutes, with increasing survival time for lower humidity levels. Experimental
47 studies showed survival at two hours in low humidity (12-15%), up to 60 minutes in
48 moderate humidity (36-37%), and 30 minutes in high humidity (60-70%) at 20°C. Three
49 publications reviewed how long measles virus was transmissible in real-world settings,
50 ranging from 60 to 120 minutes.

51 **Conclusions:** Limited evidence exists to guide the precise determination of the duration of
52 measles transmissibility. Current health department guidelines rely on limited research
53 from 1964 to 1987. Additional studies are needed to understand how long the virus is
54 transmissible in real-world settings, particularly given the implications for contact tracing
55 efficiency and resource allocation during outbreak responses.

56 **KEYWORDS**

57 Public health practice, public health preparedness, communicable diseases, disease
58 outbreaks, epidemiology, public health

59 **SUMMARY BOX**

60 1) What is the current understanding of this subject?

61
62 The current understanding of how long the measles virus remains transmissible in
63 the air is based on limited research from 1964-1987, with CDC guidelines

64 recommending a two-hour exposure window while some health departments use a
65 one-hour window.

66

67 2) What does this report add to the literature?

68

69 This report adds a comprehensive systematic review that confirms the scarcity of
70 evidence on measles virus transmissibility in air, highlighting that no new research
71 has been published since 1987 to inform contact tracing guidelines.

72

73 3) What are the implications for public health practice?

74

75 The implications for public health practice include the need for new research to
76 standardize evidence-based guidelines for measles contact tracing, which would
77 optimize resource allocation during outbreak responses, potentially reduce
78 unnecessary interventions, and help foster trust in public health activities.

79 Introduction

80 The United States eliminated measles in 2000¹ due to high vaccination rates and effective
81 public health measures; however, the U.S. has experienced several outbreaks since then,
82 typically after introduction from international travelers.² These situations are managed by
83 health department teams, which act quickly to identify people exposed to the case,
84 provide post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) to individuals without immunity where possible,
85 and quarantine contacts at risk of developing the infection. These responses are resource-
86 intensive, require significant staff time and funding, and can detract from routine health
87 department operations.³

88 Contact tracing for measles presents unique challenges. Like influenza⁴ and SARS-CoV-2⁵,
89 measles spreads through airborne and droplet transmission.⁶ However, measles also
90 remains infectious in the air for an extended time, even after the infected person is no
91 longer present.⁷ According to the current U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
92 (CDC) measles exposure guidelines, if a person experiences either of the following without
93 personal protective equipment for any amount of time, they are considered exposed: 1)
94 occupying the same air space at the same time as someone with measles or 2) entering a
95 room within 2 hours after a person with measles left.⁷ These exposure guidelines are based
96 on one experimental study of how long the measles virus remains in the air⁸, three
97 publications reviewing the evidence of real-world outbreaks (1985-1987)⁹⁻¹¹, and a
98 literature review.¹²

99 The Johns Hopkins Center for Outbreak Response Innovation conducted eleven key
100 informant interviews with U.S. state and local health departments to understand the
101 operational challenges related to contact tracing and outbreak response. Interviews took
102 place between March and October of 2024. These interviews revealed variations in the
103 measles exposure guidelines for contact tracing.¹³ While most health departments utilize
104 the two-hour exposure window recommended by the CDC, two relied on a more lenient
105 one-hour exposure window.¹⁴ The exposure window directly impacts contact tracing
106 procedures. Reducing the exposure window from two hours to one hour can substantially
107 reduce the number of people considered exposed and thus reduce the number of contacts
108 requiring notification/quarantine. A shorter exposure window would likely considerably
109 reduce staff hours and costs required to conduct these activities.¹⁵ Moreover, accurately
110 identifying the exposure window facilitates efficient contact tracing within the 72-hour
111 window when PEP remains effective.¹⁶ Accurately identifying this timeframe is also crucial
112 for ensuring that staff time and funding are appropriately managed and that routine health
113 department work is not disrupted unnecessarily. To address this inconsistency and ensure
114 that exposure guidelines are based on the strongest data available, we conducted a
115 systematic review of the evidence for how long the measles virus remains airborne and
116 capable of infection after an infectious case has left an area.

117 Methods

118 This systematic literature review follows the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic
119 Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines.¹⁷ This study aimed to examine the
120 duration of measles virus infectivity in airborne environments to guide epidemiologists in
121 determining exposure periods for contact tracing in public spaces after the presence of an
122 infectious case.

123 *Literature Search Strategy*

124 The literature search was conducted in Pubmed, EMBASE, Web of Science, and SCOPUS
125 for articles published between January 1988 and July 2024. This starting year was chosen
126 as it marks the commercialization of the taq polymerase enzyme critical for the
127 widespread utilization of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology for accurate
128 measles diagnosis.¹⁸ The following search query was used: ("measles" OR "rubeola") AND
129 ("air microbiology" OR "respiratory aerosols and droplets" OR "airborne" OR "exposure
130 period" OR "survival time" OR "environmental stability" OR "aerosol*" OR "droplet*" OR
131 "air") AND ("disease transmission, infectious" OR "transmission" OR "airborne
132 transmission" OR "survival" OR "mortality"). All results were managed through Covidence,

133 a systematic review processing software, for de-duplication, title and abstract screening,
134 full-text review, and extraction.

135 *Study Screening and Eligibility*

136 After de-duplication, two independent reviewers screened titles and abstracts to assess
137 eligibility for full-text review. Any disagreements were resolved by a third independent
138 reviewer, who made a final determination.

139 Studies were included if they examined the duration of measles infectivity in the air after an
140 infected person has left a space, specifically in public places (e.g., hospitals, airplanes,
141 grocery stores). Studies that occurred indoors and outdoors were both eligible for
142 inclusion. Eligible studies included peer-reviewed articles and grey literature from public
143 health authorities that address contact tracing in relation to exposure periods and review
144 the relevant scientific evidence. Both human and animal studies, as well as laboratory-
145 based investigations on measles infectivity in the air, were considered.

146 Exclusion criteria included recommendations and studies that were not evidence-based
147 (including mathematical models), unrelated to airborne transmission of measles in public
148 environments, and publications not in English. Reviews, editorials, opinion pieces, and
149 duplicate studies or studies with overlapping data sets were also excluded. If an outbreak
150 or airborne transmission event was discussed in both peer-reviewed articles and grey
151 literature, for example, journal publications, only the peer-reviewed articles were included
152 to reduce duplicative reporting of results.

153 The manuscripts that met inclusion criteria during the title and abstract screening were
154 advanced to a full text review. During this phase, two reviewers again independently
155 assessed each manuscript for inclusion. Items that received discordant votes were each
156 discussed during a live meeting attended by both primary reviewers and a third reviewer. In
157 this meeting, each reviewer presented their rationale, and the third reviewer made the final
158 determination after considering all viewpoints. Any manuscripts that passed the full-text
159 review were subsequently included in the data extraction and analysis phase.

160 *Supplemental Search Strategies*

161 Due to the dearth of results from the systematic literature search, additional search
162 strategies were conducted to ensure comprehensive coverage of the evidence. These
163 three additional methods included 1) review of references from literature reviews identified
164 during the Covidence search, 2) a Google Scholar search utilizing the same search query
165 as was implemented in the study databases, and 3) a review of all literature used by the
166 U.S. CDC to inform the established measles exposure guidelines. These supplemental

167 search strategies followed the same inclusion and exclusion criteria used during the
168 systematic search, except that there was no limitation applied to the date of publication.

169 Literature reviews, and therefore their content, identified during the systematic search
170 were originally excluded because they did not meet the original search criteria for primary
171 data collection. However, any literature review references that specified primary data
172 collection of measles exposure data with timeframes were included as part of the
173 supplemental search; this is referred to later in this write-up as the literature review
174 snowball sampling. Although the literature reviews themselves are still not included in the
175 results, the primary research articles themselves are included. The second supplemental
176 search strategy was the Google Scholar search, which was conducted using key phrases
177 searched in combination and independently: "Measles Exposure," "Measles Outbreak,"
178 "Measles Case Study," "Measles Case", "Measles Evidence," "Measles Airborne," and
179 "Measles Transmission." The third strategy involved reviewing the evidence published on
180 the U.S. CDC website.⁷ To aid the supplemental search, the findings of this systematic
181 review were also shared with the state and local health department partners identified
182 through previous interviews, including those that followed both one- and two-hour
183 exposure windows, and no additional articles were added.¹³

184 Results

185 Database searches initially identified 1,054 studies from four databases: Scopus (392),
186 Web of Science (262), PubMed (200), and Embase (200), as shown in Figure 1 below. After
187 removing 495 duplicates, 559 studies remained for the title and abstract screening. After
188 the first round of screening, 463 studies were excluded based on criteria outlined in the
189 methodology, leaving 96 studies for full-text review. However, none of these studies
190 ultimately met the previously mentioned criteria for data extraction and analysis.

191 The supplemental search strategies employed identified only five articles containing
192 evidence that could be used to determine how long measles virus remains infectious in the
193 air after an infected person leaves a space. All five articles were published between 1965
194 and 1987, and two were published with the same lead author. None of the five studies
195 contained primary data that could be used to inform measles contact tracing guidelines for
196 outdoor spaces.

197 The first two publications assessing measles survival in the air were experimental studies
198 published in 1964⁸ and 1965¹⁹. Measles virus survival in the air was used by the authors as
199 a proxy for the window of time a person may be infected after an infected person leaves an
200 indoor space. These studies used aerosolized measles virus in a room where air samples

201 were taken at regular intervals and the surviving virus was estimated by titration. Both
202 articles were published by the primary author J.G. de Jong one year apart. The first study,
203 published in 1964, showed that measles virus survived two hours when disseminated in a
204 room with low humidity (relative humidity 12-15%) but less than 30 minutes in a room with
205 high humidity (relative humidity 68-70%).⁸ This study did not account for factors such as
206 light or airflow, and temperature was held constant at 20°C (68°F). The second article,
207 which was an extension of the first, considered additional factors that may affect the
208 duration of measles infectivity in air, such as additional variations in humidity, slight
209 variations in temperature, and the presence or absence of artificial light.¹⁹ These findings
210 reaffirmed conclusions in the previous article and showed that measles virus survives for
211 less time in the air with increasing levels of humidity when temperature is held constant at
212 20°C. In the 1965 study, measles was tested at 36-37% relative humidity (RH) and 60-64%
213 RH, with the virus surviving for at least 60 minutes at the former RH and only 30 minutes at
214 the latter RH. The presence or absence of artificial light was not found to have any effect on
215 measles virus survival in the air when temperature and humidity were constant. Measles
216 virus survival was slightly longer at 15°C than at 20°C, however, the influence of this on the
217 survival time in the air was not reported.¹⁹

218 Twenty years later, three publications reported observational data that included evidence
219 on the duration of measles virus transmissibility. The 1985 study by Remington et al.
220 discusses an outbreak of measles in a pediatrician's office. The article identified three
221 children who developed measles after being exposed in a pediatric office 60 to 75 minutes
222 after the index case had departed.¹¹ According to the timeline provided by the authors, one
223 of the secondary cases arrived at 1:30 PM (60 minutes after the case departed) and
224 became infected; the next secondary case arrived a little after 1:30 PM (about 65 minutes
225 after the case departed) and became infected; and the last secondary case arrived around
226 1:45 PM (about 75 minutes after the case departed) and became infected. Of the three
227 children that became infected in the 60-75 minutes after the index case departed, two
228 were under the age of 15 months and one was age 15 months to 18 years. All three were
229 unvaccinated. A total of 32 children were present within 90 minutes after the case
230 departed, and only the three children discussed above became infected. An additional 28
231 children were present in the pediatric office 90 minutes or more after the infected case
232 departed and none of these individuals developed a measles infection. Interestingly, the
233 observed attack rates for unvaccinated children present with the index case and
234 unvaccinated children that arrived less than 90 minutes after the index case are similar,
235 around 25%, whereas the attack rate for unvaccinated children arriving 90 minutes or more
236 after the index case is zero. Remington et al. emphasized that factors such as coughing
237 and inadequate fresh-air ventilation can prolong the duration of airborne infectivity,

238 increasing the risk of transmission to susceptible individuals who enter the space after an
239 infected person has left.¹¹ The second observational publication by Bloch et al. describes a
240 measles outbreak in a pediatric practice where the index patient, who was in the second
241 day of rash, was able to transmit measles to other patients through airborne transmission,
242 even after leaving the office.¹⁰ The article suggests that measles virus can remain
243 infectious in the air for at least one hour after the index patient has left the area, providing
244 evidence that measles can be transmitted through airborne spread even in the days after
245 symptom onset, rather than just in the pre-rash period as previously believed. The specific
246 duration and time windows are not reported as they had been in the Remington article;
247 therefore, it is not clear how much greater than one hour the exposure window was. The
248 final publication summarized how long measles virus remains transmissible after an
249 infectious case leaves a space in a hospital setting. During this outbreak, individuals who
250 arrived 29 to 120 minutes after a case was present contracted measles. The minimum
251 exposure window in this outbreak was observed when an 8-month-old was infected with
252 measles after entering an emergency room 29 minutes after the index case was no longer
253 present. The maximum exposure window observed was when a 24-year-old contracted
254 measles while purchasing medications at the university hospital two hours after an
255 infected internal medicine resident passed by the pharmacy seeking evaluation for her
256 illness.²⁰

257 A summary of the results is available in Table 1. Both the smallest and largest exposure
258 windows were identified from laboratory studies. The smallest infectious exposure window
259 reported was about 30 minutes, which was dependent on high humidity (68-70%) and
260 room temperature (20°C) while the largest exposure window was about 120 minutes,
261 which was dependent on low humidity (12-15%) at room temperature (20°C).⁸
262 Observational studies reported an exposure window within the range of that reported by
263 the experimental studies, both within the general range of 60 to 90 minutes. No additional
264 observational or experimental studies have met the criteria for assessing the exposure
265 window since 1985.

266 Discussion

267 All four hallmark articles that were identified through our search strategy highlight
268 important features of measles airborne infectivity, though limited in scope. Based on the
269 combination of formal and informal search strategies, this search is comprehensive and
270 demonstrates that there is minimal published evidence to guide precise determination of
271 how long measles remains infectious in the air after an infected individual is no longer

272 present. It is clear there is a gap in existing evidence on the duration of measles infectivity
273 in air, and whatever existing research exists is long outdated.

274 *Study Limitations*

275 Search criteria in the systematic review was limited to manuscripts published in English,
276 potentially excluding useful research in other languages. The search was limited to January
277 1988 to July 2024 after PCR testing became widespread to reduce potential bias from
278 improper diagnosis, but may have inadvertently excluded earlier studies that could have
279 provided valuable insights into airborne transmission. However, our supplemental search
280 mitigated this risk by including earlier studies. Also, changes in Medical Subject Heading
281 (MeSH) terms over time may have resulted in the omission of relevant studies that were
282 indexed under our search terminologies. Additionally, certain older papers lack abstracts
283 or are available only as scanned PDFs without searchable text, which would not have been
284 detected by the search engine utilized and would have led these papers to be inadvertently
285 excluded. Furthermore, while we developed a comprehensive set of search terms, it is
286 possible that some relevant studies were missed due to variability in terminology used by
287 authors. These factors may have limited the ability to capture the full breadth of all
288 available relevant evidence.

289 *Research Needs*

290 Health departments currently rely on CDC measles exposure guidelines based on research
291 from De Jong,^{8,19} Remington,¹¹ and Bloch¹⁰ between 1964 and 1985. While beneficial,
292 additional evidence is needed to better understand how long measles remains infectious
293 in the air after a case is no longer present. This evidence can be gathered through
294 additional laboratory and observational studies.

295 Laboratory studies are needed to better understand how the measles virus survives in the
296 air and on surfaces under different environmental conditions and in various settings.
297 Current literature only evaluates measles survival at 20°C (68°F) and fails to consider the
298 diverse factors present in public settings. Additionally, existing studies have only examined
299 measles survival in controlled environments. Future research should investigate how
300 measles survives in spaces that mimic real-world environments, such as classrooms,
301 open-concept offices, grocery stores, restaurants, airplanes, and hospitals. This will help
302 inform how spatial obstacles and modern HVAC and air filtration systems can influence
303 the movement and survival of the measles virus in places where people are most likely to
304 be exposed. Some modeling studies have addressed this to a limited degree. Riley et al. in
305 1978 developed a mathematical model to analyze a measles outbreak in a suburban
306 elementary school, highlighting the airborne transmission of the virus.²¹

307 Additional observational studies gathered from real-world outbreaks are also needed to
308 understand the actual exposure window for measles contacts after cases are no longer
309 present. This information could be gathered through coordinated efforts by state and local
310 health departments conducting measles case investigations in their jurisdictions. Health
311 departments should consider collecting exposure time windows for each contact
312 identified in a case and organizing databases so that epidemiologists can easily determine
313 which contacts became cases. Coordinating entities could then pool de-identified data on
314 the exposure windows for each contact and calculate the attack rates for exposure times.

315 This systematic review also identified a gap in evidence necessary for contact tracing in
316 outdoor public spaces. Although this systematic review was not limited to indoor settings,
317 the researchers also did not identify any experimental or observational studies that
318 assessed measles virus infectivity in outdoor air spaces that met the other inclusion
319 criteria. Future studies in these settings are needed to inform evidence-based measles
320 contact tracing.

321 Public Health Implications

322 Research is needed to clarify how long the measles virus remains transmissible after an
323 infectious case leaves a public space. Robust evidence would enable health departments
324 to refine and standardize evidence-based guidelines rooted in science and tailored to
325 actual risks to optimize contact tracing while minimizing unnecessary interventions.
326 Whether the research confirms the two-hour window or suggests adjustments, such
327 research would improve public health responses' efficiency and effectiveness, fostering
328 trust in evidence-based recommendations.

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335 Dayton & Montgomery, Public Health- Seattle & King County, South Carolina Department
336 of Health, Tennessee Department of Health, and additional state and local health
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


Figure 1. PRISMA Framework with the number of studies identified across each phase.

Table 1. Summary of all publications utilizing primary data that could be used to inform exposure windows for measles contact tracing after an infectious case is no longer present in indoor or outdoor space.

Setting	Environmental Conditions	Infectious Exposure Window	Citation
Laboratory Experiment	Humidity: 12-15% Temperature: 20°C	120 min	De Jong et al. 1964 ^a
	Humidity: 68-70% Temperature: 20°C	<30 min	
	Humidity: 60-64% Temperature: 20°C	30 min	De Jong et al. 1965 ^b
	Humidity: 36-37% Temperature: 20°C	>60 min	
Pediatric Outpatient Office	Humidity: 22% Temperature: 20°C	60-75 min	Remington et al. 1985 ^a
	Humidity: not reported Temperature: not reported	1hr	Bloch et al. 1985 ^a
Hospital Pharmacy	Humidity: not reported Temperature: not reported	29-120 min	Sienko et al. 1987 ^a

^a Utilized to inform CDC measles contact tracing guidelines.

^b Not utilized to inform CDC measles contact tracing guidelines.